China Cancels Two-Thirds of Planned Overseas Coal Capacity, Estimated to Avoid Billions of Tonnes of CO₂

Five years after a UN pledge to stop new overseas coal plants, researchers find 61.5 GW cancelled and major emissions avoided—while private captive projects keep a pipeline open.

Today’s Progress

In September 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping told the United Nations General Assembly that China would not build new coal-fired power projects abroad and would increase support for green energy in developing countries. A joint assessment released this week by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) and People of Asia for Climate Solutions (PACS), timed for the UN General Assembly and New York Climate Week, measures what has happened since.

According to the report, 67 percent of the China-linked overseas coal capacity that was planned in 2021 has been cancelled—61.5 gigawatts in total. Researchers estimate those cancellations avoid roughly 6.4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide over the plants’ operating lifetimes. In the twelve months through July 2026, another 7.1 GW left the pipeline, including 3.4 GW in Zimbabwe, 1.7 GW in Bangladesh, and 1.4 GW in Indonesia.

State-owned enterprises and policy banks have largely stepped back from public utility coal projects. At the same time, CREA and PACS document continued China-linked activity: 3.3 GW entered construction in the past year, and 20.5 GW remains in planning without formal cancellation—capacity the authors link to about 2.8 billion tonnes of potential lifetime emissions. Indonesia hosts the largest share of operational China-linked coal capacity at 17.1 GW, followed by Vietnam (3.8 GW) and Pakistan (3.4 GW).

A parallel shift appears on the clean-energy side. Reporting on the same study notes growth in China-linked renewable projects overseas since the pledge—evidence that Beijing’s overseas energy footprint is not only shrinking on coal.

Why This Matters

Coal plants lock in decades of emissions, local air pollution, and water stress. Scrapping 61.5 GW before construction is a concrete cut in future harm, not a paper target. Host countries that once relied on Chinese public finance for coal may have had to revisit energy plans as that capital withdrew.

The benefit is incomplete. Off-grid “captive” coal plants—built mainly by private Chinese firms to power mineral processing and industrial parks, especially nickel and aluminum complexes in Indonesia—sit outside the clearest reading of the state ban. CREA finds captive units account for a large share of capacity that entered operation or construction after 2021. When commercial industrial demand drives new coal, the climate gain from cancelled public projects is partly offset.

Still, the scale of estimated avoided lifetime emissions from the cancelled pipeline is substantial.

Evidence and Context

The findings rest on CREA and PACS project-level tracking of China-linked overseas coal since the 2021 pledge, updated through mid-2026. Associated Press coverage of the report frames the cancellations as a “small bright spot” while stressing loopholes. South China Morning Post and other outlets report the same CREA–PACS headline figures: two-thirds of the 2021 planned pipeline gone, an estimated 6.4 billion tonnes of lifetime CO₂ avoided.

Limits are clear. Cancellation of planned plants is not the same as early retirement of plants already running. Private captive projects and remaining pre-construction capacity mean the ban is not fully implemented. Energy-security shocks in parts of Southeast Asia have also increased coal use in some grids, a separate pressure the report and AP note. The emissions “avoided” figure is an estimate of lifetime output that would have occurred if cancelled plants had been built and run as assumed; it is not a measured atmospheric reduction already achieved.

Trade-off: industrial parks tied to battery metals and other transition materials still often run on captive coal, linking one decarbonization supply chain to another fossil expansion.

What Made This Possible

Beijing formalized the overseas coal pledge in national energy planning and directed state firms and policy banks away from new foreign coal. Host governments and developers then cancelled or stranded many early-stage deals once Chinese public finance withdrew. Independent monitoring by CREA and PACS has kept the pipeline visible year after year, making gaps harder to ignore.

Progress Toward Global Goals

The cancellations align with SDG 13 (Climate Action) by reducing planned high-carbon capacity and associated lifetime CO₂. Growth in China-linked overseas renewables supports SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) where those projects displace or avoid new coal. Continued captive coal expansion works against both goals in affected industrial zones. No UDHR article is directly engaged by the capacity data alone.

Building on This Success

The following possibilities were generated with the assistance of AI to explore how this progress might be improved, expanded, or adapted. They are ideas for further investigation, not established findings or recommendations from the people featured in the original reporting.

Closing the captive-coal gap would require treating off-grid industrial plants as covered by the same overseas standard that state developers already follow, paired with renewable power mandates inside mineral parks. Early-retirement finance for China-backed plants already operating—through renegotiated loans or dedicated wind-down funds—could shrink locked-in emissions beyond the cancelled pipeline. Transparent, project-level disclosure of all China-linked overseas generation, public and private, would let host regulators and lenders test compliance against measurable capacity and commissioning dates.

How much of China’s 2021 overseas coal pledge has turned into cancelled capacity and avoided emissions—and where do loopholes still allow new plants?

The CREA–PACS ledger answers the first part with hard numbers: 61.5 GW cancelled, about 6.4 billion tonnes of lifetime CO₂ estimated avoided, state actors largely out of new public coal. The second part is equally specific: private captive plants, concentrated in Indonesian industrial parks, plus 20.5 GW still planned and 3.3 GW newly under construction, show where the pledge’s design and enforcement still leave room for coal.

Three Promising Next Steps

1. Cover captive plants under the pledge — Chinese regulators and industry associations · extend the no-new-overseas-coal rule to off-grid industrial units · obstacle: private commercial incentives in nickel and aluminum · test: year-on-year fall in new captive coal MW permitted or financed after a formal scope expansion.
2. Cancel or repurpose the remaining 20.5 GW pre-construction pipeline — host governments with Chinese counterparties · convert sites to renewables or drop permits before ground-breaking · obstacle: sunk development costs and local industrial demand · test: official cancellations logged against the CREA/PACS planning list within 24 months.
3. Pair existing China-backed plants with retirement pathways — Chinese lenders and development funds · subsidised early retirement or debt restructuring tied to a fixed closure date · obstacle: contract terms and host-grid reliability · test: announced retirement dates covering a measurable share of the operating China-linked fleet.

What Readers Can Watch

• Whether the next CREA/PACS update shows a drop in captive coal under construction in Indonesia.
• Official Chinese guidance that explicitly includes private and off-grid overseas coal in the 2021 ban.
• Commissioning versus cancellation notices for the 20.5 GW still listed as planned.